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Extensive attention has been given to countries that run current account deficits, but little attention has 
been devoted to understanding why countries run large surpluses.  This is surprising given that 
unsustainable international imbalances result from one as much as the other.  We begin with a wide-
ranging review of the literature to better understand the political and economic forces that lead to 
demand decreasing policies. We then demonstrate how the systemic choices made within the Bretton 
Woods and Post Bretton Woods periods constrained and enabled the generation of large surpluses. 
Next, we examine imbalances at the global level to determine whether they are getting bigger rather 
than trending toward external balance. We find evidence that the trend towards imbalance is 
strengthening.  We then analyze the patterns of these surpluses in four countries noting where 
government policies have most prominently contributed to the surpluses, pointing out the differing 
motivations for and implementations of these policies across countries. This leads us to ask, finally, 
what these trends portend and what can be done to mitigate or reverse them if they bode ill for global 
economic well-being. 
 
JEL Classification: F4, F6 





The issue of large current account imbalances among some nations has received attention in 
recent years among both economists and the popular press.  While these imbalances have 
episodically been examined symmetrically, that is from the perspective of both the surplus 
and the deficit countries, critical attention has emphasized altering national policies that work 
towards deficits rather than those that promote surpluses.  No matter which perspective one 
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adopts, the global policy problem is that sudden stops to these financial flows are associated 
with economic contractions.  Nations with large and persistent current account deficits often 
find that it may become increasingly difficult to borrow funds internationally.  The United 
States is an exception, as it is able to attract additional foreign funds despite a net 
international investment position of $-9.63 trillion as of September 30, 2018.  Smaller 
countries are not so fortunate.  For various reasons, some countries reach a point where the 
international financial community refuses to provide additional funding without an agreement 
in place with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which imposes “conditions” on the 
borrowing countries’ economic policies.  These deals often require restrictive monetary and 
fiscal policies, cuts in government subsidies and pensions, or other politically unpopular 
measures in an effort to improve the long-run prospects for an economy. 
Since current account balances globally must sum to zero, the existence of deficit countries 
must also mean that other countries must be running surpluses.  The objective of this paper is 
to explore the motivation and recent experience of countries adopting economic policies that 
result in persistent current account surpluses.  Policies that utilize a trade surplus to promote 
economic development can trace their origins back centuries at least to the “mercantilist” 
strategy promoted by Jean Baptiste Colbert, principal minister and advisor to Louis XIV of 
France in the 17th century.  The intellectual history on this issue is rich as well, with 
contributions from contemporaries of Adam Smith to some of the most respected 
international economists of the 20th century. 
We believe that, for various reasons, policies that utilize current account surpluses as part of 
an economic strategy are widely used in the world today and have been for many years.  The 
growth of international reserves from less than $2 trillion in 1999 to a peak of over $12 
trillion in 2014, a six fold increase in 15 years, is evidence of this.  The IMF has recognized 
this trend with the establishment of an annual External Sector Report (the Seventh Annual 
Report was released in July 2018) which classifies nations’ external balances as “higher than 
desirable” and “lower than desirable” based on an analytical model it has created.   
The issue of nations experiencing “higher than desirable” surpluses raises several policy 
issues that make it worthy of study.  First, surplus countries may be deliberately taking 
actions that restrain aggregate demand below their national output.  If at the global level 
Say’s Law applies, and supply creates its own demand, then the issue would be moot.  Since 
this does not appear to be the case, especially in the short term, large surpluses might still be 
acceptable if there are other countries willing and able to run current account deficits.  But 
what happens when deficit countries are suddenly unable (due to a sudden stop) or unwilling 
(because of a belief that the deficit, on balance, sends jobs and income overseas) to do so?  If 
all countries attempt to run positive trade surpluses, the paradox of thrift tells us that such 
attempts will lead to a reduction in global economic growth.  Second, deficit countries may 
decide that the best way to restore external balance is adopt protectionist measures to restrict 
imports from surplus countries.  Since increasing trade restrictions typically lead to 
retaliation, the result would be a slowdown in trade that is undesirable for everyone.  Third, 
large imbalances can also lead to resentment between surplus and deficit countries.  In the 
Euro Area for example, nations that are currently experiencing surpluses may resent having 
to provide support to deficit countries, while deficit countries begrudge the surplus countries 
for not sufficiently supporting policies that help the deficit countries move back toward their 
potential output and employment levels. 
To understand why we are where we are, and to consider what might be done to increase 
global demand should this be the ultimately desired policy, we examine the world from a 
number of perspectives. First, beginning in section two, we conduct a wide-ranging review of 
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the literature to recognize the political and economic forces that lead to policies that can be 
succinctly summarized as maintaining an external trade surplus. We examine various 
motivations for and promulgations of these policies and compare their similarities and 
differences.  In section three, we discuss how the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of 
international finance in the 1970s allowed increases in either trade surpluses or deficits 
depending on a country’s policy objectives.  We then, in section four, empirically examine if 
external surpluses and deficits are getting bigger rather than trending toward external balance, 
and, if they are, determine whether the trend is strengthening or weakening. We find evidence 
that the trend is strengthening over time and that there is very strong path dependence of 
deficits and surpluses at the national level. In section five, we examine some countries that 
have maintained large surpluses.  Policies that contribute to deficits have received a 
tremendous amount of attention, and we believe that shifting more attention towards surplus 
generating policies is overdue.  Section six provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Economic policies that require a nation to run a current account surplus have often been 
referred to as mercantilist for centuries.  In his Presidential Address to the 1973 Annual 
Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Harry G. Johnson stated: 
“Like any other body of thought and group of thinkers important enough to merit being called 
an ‘-ism,’ mercantilism was a collection of often mutually contradictory ideas expressed with 
varying degrees of clarity by men of widely varying levels of intelligence and reasoning 
power. 
Reduced to its bare essentials, however, and doing far less than justice to the percipience of 
many of the writers concerned, it amounted to two propositions: that the wealth of a country 
consisted in the quantity of precious metals in circulation or in hoards within its borders, and 
that the way to increase that wealth was to secure a surplus on the balance of payments, 
usually identified with a balance on merchandise trade, by policies of import substitution and 
export promotion.”  (Johnson, 1974) 
Mercantilism does not derive from a theory of economic behavior. Likewise, it does not 
derive from a theory of political behavior. Rather, what is now thought of as mercantilism is a 
description of the political economic reality in some Northern European countries in the post 
medieval, pre industrial period (Grampp 1952). French mercantilism of Colbert (Allen 1988, 
Coleman 1988) was not quite the same as English mercantilism, although they did share 
many features.  Mercantilism, as it is now understood, was characterized by a concern for 
power and plenty (Heckscher 1936, Viner 1948).  Power was both military and economic.  
Power enabled national security by giving the country the wherewithal to wage and prevail in 
war (Viner 1948, Coleman 1988).  Plenty was an employed, productive and content populace: 
the average person did not want.  With plenty came domestic political stability and high 
national social welfare (Grampp 1952, McCusker 1996).  For many, although not all (Pincus 
2012), mercantilists the political economic world was zero-sum: your gain was my loss 
(Heckscher 1936, Viner 1948, Allen 1988, Coleman 1988, Irwin 1991, 1992).  This 
worldview led to policies supporting colonial expansion, securing sources of foreign goods 
(for importation and re-export), dominance of trade routes and the promotion of exports to 
maintain a positive balance of trade.  The aim of these policies was to maintain power and 
ensure plenty (McCusker 1996, Pincus 2013).  To the extent that there was a consistent 
political goal, economic actors sought to use the achievement thereof to their individual 
benefit through rent-seeking activities (Ekelund and Tollison 1997), such as seeking 
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protection from foreign competition (Pincus 2013) and monopoly privilege (Irwin 1991). 
In the post-World War II period, a “New Mercantilism” emerged that focused on ‘plenty’ 
rather than ‘power.’  In this “new-mercantilism,” the policy goal was one of achieving 
sustained economic growth and full employment (plenty) in one’s own economy through 
trade surpluses coupled with the accumulation of foreign assets (no longer just specie).  Joan 
Robinson (1966) dissected the aims and methods of the “new mercantilism”, in her 1966 
inaugural lecture as a full professor and fellow of Girton College at Cambridge University, 
setting out the issues that challenged policy makers then and continue to challenge policy 
makers today.  Robinson highlights a tension between the efficiency argument underpinning 
free trade and the distributional outcomes of free trade. In her view, free trade promises the 
best outcome for the international economic system taken as a whole.  It does not promise 
that each constituent economy will be better off.  Second, she identifies the costly real 
adjustments countries running balance of trade deficits funded by international borrowing are 
required to take in order to equilibrate the system when capital inflows are no longer 
forthcoming. Third, she recognizes that countries pursuing policies that rely on running 
current account surpluses can only be successful in their aims if other countries run current 
account deficits.  While everyone can be a free trader, not everyone can be a new mercantilist. 
Recognizing the limitations of both free trade and new mercantilism, Robinson explains why 
countries seeking full employment and income growth often prefer new mercantilist rather 
than free trade policies. First, countries seek to protect their economies against external 
shocks by running a surplus.  This surplus allows them to build up a stock of foreign financial 
assets that enables them to manage their exchange rate, insures them against attacks on their 
currency and/or allows them to offset capital outflows.  Second, countries, perhaps 
understanding the high real costs of moving from deficit to balance or surplus, are loss 
averse, and prefer to gain rather than to lose reserves.  This strengthens the tendency to 
maintain a balance of trade surplus by emphasizing production over domestic consumption.  
Third, surpluses allow the accumulation of foreign assets, which may promise a return in 
excess of what can be earned at home and which may provide diversification.  However, this 
can be taken to an extreme when investing at home is preferable to investing abroad, but 
foreign investment continues to trump domestic investment since the risk of losing the 
surplus in the attempt to reallocate the investment portfolio is unacceptably high.  Loss 
aversion again prevails.  Fourth, countries wish to produce more than domestic demand 
would allow, thereby increasing employment. 
But, when the deficit countries that hold up this house of cards pursue deficit-reducing 
policies to avail of the economic benefits thereof, the carefully balanced edifice may collapse.  
Avoiding this is as essential today as it was a half century ago when Robinson conducted her 
analysis. While the following discussion brings her analysis up to date, the issues remain the 
same, and the structural deficiencies are, if anything, worse. 
A decade after Robinson’s lecture near the end of the Bretton Woods international monetary 
system, Schmid (1974) declared the era of free trade dead.  Schmid identifies the Bretton 
Woods era as an anomalous period characterized by economic and political stability and the 
unassailable economic dominance of the United States.  During this period free trade, to the 
extent it was practiced, was not inimical to growth.  Dooley, et al. (2003, 2004), examine the 
post Bretton Woods era as a recreation of the Bretton Woods system.  They characterize the 
Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system as having a free trade core – the United States – 
and a neo- mercantilist periphery of emerging, capital poor financially weak, economies – 
Europe and Japan.  The economies in the periphery pursued an export-led growth strategy by 
maintaining undervalued exchange rates, imposing capital controls, and accumulating 
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international reserve assets.  At the core, the United States was the financial intermediary that 
made this possible.  At the end of the Bretton Woods era, the European and Japanese 
economies had emerged: their capital stocks and financial institutions were internationally 
competitive, obviating the need for their exchange rates to remain fixed, and moving them 
into the core.  While the Bretton Woods system broke down, the need for such a system to 
provide the economic framework for growth did not. Dooley, et al. contend that the Asian 
economies have recreated the Bretton Woods system with them as the periphery economies 
and the United States continuing in its core function, largely without the support of fellow 
members of the core as they cannot supply dollar denominated assets, supplying the reserve 
assets to the periphery economies to enable their export-led growth policies, the same policies 
as Europe and Japan had pursued earlier.  Cwik (2011) also analyzes the neo-mercantilist 
policies of Asian economies, but argues, that they are doomed to failure, as the outcomes 
suggested by Dooley, et al. should not be expected or guaranteed by currency manipulation 
policies.  Others, discussed below, also do not agree with the Dooley, et al., analysis.  What is 
agreed is that reserve accumulation, where reserve assets are, largely, United States Treasury 
securities, is costly and dampens global demand, and that the United States provides the 
lion’s share of the demand upon which the system depends. 
Scott (2011) defines neo-mercantilist strategies (which he prefers to call enhanced 
mobilization strategies) as overarching economic development policies designed specifically 
to enable a country to catch up to its competitors.  It generally requires that the country faces 
a recognized and internally accepted external threat or challenge that enables the 
promulgation of policies that require members of society to make current sacrifices to 
enhance the common good and ensure a better future.  This requires market distorting 
policies that increase saving, reduce both wage and capital costs, increase the risk-adjusted 
returns to investment, both human and physical, ensure an undervalued exchange rate, and 
repress demand by shifting economic resources away from consumption toward production, 
reducing imports and promoting exports.  If successful, these policies lead to rapid 
industrialization and growth.  The weight of these policies fall squarely on the shoulders of 
the workers and savers who see wage growth and returns to saving repressed as it is by this 
means that investment and risk- taking is rewarded with over-market returns.  The promised 
payoff to the workers is a more economically secure future for themselves and their children 
when the returns may be more equitably shared. 
Wholly successful enhanced mobilization strategies are few, especially in liberal 
democracies.  As Scott (2011) notes, these economies tend to founder when their initial goals 
have been achieved and a transition to a post-enhanced mobilization strategy is required.  
Sweden, Japan, and Ireland are examples of countries that had successful enhanced 
mobilization strategies but that were unable to make that transition and suffered severe 
economic setbacks as wages rose dramatically, productivity fell, and/or sheltered banking 
systems (which lent to the local firms operating in a distorted market that masked true market 
returns) causing financial crises from which it can take a long time to recover. 
Recently, focus has shifted onto two of the economies that have most successfully weathered 
the 2007-09 financial crisis, China and Germany, where their successes have been identified 
to be at the cost of their trading partners: those that provide the demand. As the recent 
financial crisis loomed on the horizon, Palley (2006) suggested that China’s neo-
mercantilist/export-led growth policies, which rely heavily on the United States as a 
destination for China’s manufactured goods, are a significant cause of the United States’ 
burgeoning trade deficit, its declining manufacturing sectors, and its fragile financial sector.  
He worries that these factors together may undermine the strength of the US economy, 
forcing it to grow more slowly or fall into recession, either of which would lead to a 
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reduction in demand for Chinese goods and thereby rebound on the Chinese economy, 
driving it into recession or lowering its rate of growth.  To guard against this, Palley 
suggested that China needed to undo its neo- mercantilist policies by increasing domestic 
demand.  To achieve this goal it must, among other things, end the repression of wages and 
the return to saving.  If wages and the returns earned by small savers rise the benefits of its 
successful growth strategy will be shared via a more equal income distribution.  In concert 
with other Asian economies, China should end competitive hoarding to maintain an 
undervalued currency (Aizenman and Lee 2008), and revalue its currency.  Ending wage and 
financial repression, the foundation upon which neo-mercantilist policies are built, requires a 
fundamental restructuring of the Chinese economy that gives workers voice and demands that 
banks make and monitor loans on the basis of sound economic principles rather than 
industrial policy or other considerations.  Although China has been taking hesitant steps in 
this direction, largely to establish the yuan as a reserve currency, these changes are easier said 
than done, and as Willett and Chiu (2012) suggest, domestic political exigencies and 
international power relationships (both in and between China and the US as well as 
elsewhere) militate against taking the difficult policy decisions needed until forced to do so 
by a crisis.  Indeed, China’s international infrastructural development policy is designed 
specifically to enhance its neo-mercantilist/hegemonic powers in Asia and beyond, 
consolidating its economic and political dominance in the region (Holslag 2010), behavior in 
many ways reminiscent of the English drive to dominate the trade routes, and thereby ensure 
power and plenty, in the seventeenth century (Irwin 1991).   The view that China’s policies 
are unabashedly neo-mercantilist is not shared by all (Prasad and Wei 2005), but whatever 
their motivation, the results in terms of external balance are largely the same. 
While Germany’s economy is much smaller than China’s, its current account surplus is 
currently larger than China’s. Since German reunification, Germany has pursued a 
manufacturing based export-led development strategy (Hassel 2013).  This development 
strategy has been underpinned by welfare cutbacks and market liberalization, both of which 
have put downward pressure on factor costs, as well as an institutional structure that 
depresses domestic demand.  Unions have agreed to wage and conditions of employment 
concessions to protect core staff while enabling firms to adjust employment at the periphery, 
even by shifting what had been core to the periphery, where employment can be part or short 
time, the so-called mini-jobs, and not well paid.  Wages in service sector employment are 
held down by wages in manufacturing, which are seen as a natural cap, and the lowest wages 
are supplemented by social benefits.  Without pressure from below, wages remain low 
thereby depressing domestic demand.  The fiscal federalist tax and benefit structure, under 
which the low paid are highly taxed, further reinforces this demand repression.  The structural 
changes required to encourage domestic demand are significant, and some argue if they are 
needed at all (Funk 2014), but the external, much of it emerging market, demand upon which 
the policy stands or falls cannot be guaranteed going forward. 
Eichengreen and Panizza  (2016) examine many instances in which high debt countries have 
successfully lowered their unsustainable debt loads.  They find that this generally only occurs 
when indebted countries are able to run current account surpluses.  So within the EU, matters 
will have to be arranged so that the highly indebted south can run a surplus.  Continued 
surpluses among several Northern EU countries are not consistent with debt sustainability for 
the South.  Jason (2015) puts the point bluntly.  “A persistent German surplus makes it harder 
for the Eurozone as a whole and the southern peripheral economies in particular to recover 
from the current financial crisis by imposing a Europe-wide “deflationary bias” through 
pushing up the exchange rate of the euro, exporting feeble German inflation and projecting its 
  
40
J. Berdell, T. S. Mondschean, R. A. Pecchenino, SPOUDAI Journal, Vol. 69 (2019), Issue 3, pp. 35-54
ultra-tight macroeconomic policies onto crisis economies.”1  Fatás and Summers (2015) also 
insist that an increase in aggregate demand in the surplus countries of Europe, particularly 
Germany, is central to sustainable debt levels and employment levels in the south. 
While some neo-mercantilist policies are designed to promote economic development, other 
policies, not necessarily neo-mercantilist in conception but rather in outward appearance, are 
designed more narrowly to self-insure against economic fluctuations caused by unforeseen 
international capital outflows and sudden stops.  To self-insure, a country must accumulate a 
sizable quantity of highly marketable, international financial assets such as stocks of major 
international companies, bonds issued by creditworthy governments and corporations, and 
short-term, liquid assets, such as United States Treasury bills.  While this stock of reserves is 
not invested in domestic investment projects that enhance a nation’s capital stock, it does 
provide the economy with liquidity it may need when, as a result of external shocks, 
international funds dry up or capital flight occurs.  This buffer stock enhances the economic 
stability of a country.  Calvo, et al. (2013) find that self-insuring in this way reduces the 
probability of sudden stops as well as the costs thereof.  Durdu et al. (2009) establish that this 
self-insurance is effective in combatting the vagaries of financial globalization and sudden 
stop risk, but not output fluctuations.  Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2013) show that the 
accumulation of net external assets, that is self-insurance, together with a flexible exchange 
rate regime, counter-cyclical monetary policy, more developed domestic financial and capital 
markets, and openness to trade have improved the economic growth performance of Latin 
American economies.  Their description of effective policies is, clearly, not neo-mercantilist.  
Yet the reserve accumulation component, clearly reminiscent of the accumulation of specie in 
the Mercantilist period, still puts a brake on domestic demand.  However, without it, 
countries are subject to sudden stops and balance of payment crises, even those in the 
Eurozone (Merler and Pisani-Ferry 2012), which operates more as a fixed-exchange rate 
system than a true monetary union thereby creating additional strategic inefficiencies 
(Hernandez and Trejos 2013).  Sudden stops, also, do not only plague emerging markets and 
economies on the periphery of Europe but could also challenge the United States (Willett and 
Chiu 2012) and its special role in the international monetary system as both liquidity provider 
and insurer (Gourinchas and Rey 2014), suggesting that the United States may have to re-
evaluate its position as the provider of liquidity to the system but in so doing undermining the 
system it supports.   
Furthermore, as Aizenman (2008) has convincingly argued, the accumulation and hoarding of 
international reserves and sovereign wealth fund assets to self-insure, to guard against real 
effective exchange rate effects of terms of trade shocks, to allow more effective adjustment to 
external shocks, and, perhaps to promote exports via the equivalent of competitive 
devaluations, something which inextricably links the Asian economies, but perhaps not to 
their joint benefit, has adversely changed the international financial architecture into 
something more decentralized and less cooperative. In the next section, we argue that the 
ability of countries to engage in policies that grow international reserves and improve the net 
investment position of a nation was greatly enhanced by the demise of the Bretton Woods 
system in the 1970s. 
 
 
1 Schiliro (2017) examined the relation between current accounts and debt problems and found that fiscal union 
along with democratic legitimacy will be needed to successfully address these challenges. 
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3.  The Rise of Neo-Mercantilist Opportunities 
What has become known as the Bretton Woods system of international finance that lasted 
from 1947 to 1973 was a remarkable period in economic history.  As the first half of the 
twentieth century was coming to a close, the world had experienced two world wars and a 
global economic depression.  Policymakers were determined to create structures that would 
support both economic and political security.  The designers of Bretton Woods were careful 
to balance the desires of individual countries to pursue national economic strategies with a 
need for global economic cooperation to foster worldwide economic growth.  The strategy 
had several pillars.  First, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 
established to promote the multilateral reduction of trade barriers across the world.  Through 
various rounds of trade agreements culminating in the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization in 1995, trade barriers were gradually eased and international trade flourished. 
A second pillar was the establishment of a fixed exchange rate system pegged to the US 
dollar as a substitute for the Gold Standard.  The US government tied its currency to the price 
of gold and other countries pegged their currencies to the dollar. Given that the United States 
possessed most of the world’s monetary gold at the end of World War II, it agreed to allow 
official outflows to foreign central banks desiring to rebuild gold stocks in the post-war era.  
The International Monetary Fund was established to provide an international source of 
liquidity to countries addressing short-term balance of payments deficits under the system. 
However, the architects of Bretton Woods also understood the trilemma of international 
finance which holds that any nation must give up at least one of the following three policy 
choices: fixed exchange rates, international capital mobility, and domestic control over 
monetary policy.  Under the Gold Standard as it was practiced in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, countries followed the “rules of the game,” which meant inter alia 
allowing balance of payments imbalances to affect the domestic money supply (i. e., no 
sterilization allowed).  The designers of Bretton Woods, however, had a different idea. They 
allowed for nations to pursue their own monetary policy but implemented strict capital 
controls.  This is an aspect of the Bretton Woods system that has received the least attention 
from economists. 
Capital controls, however, were crucial in reducing the ability to engage in neo- mercantilist 
economic strategies.  If capital controls were binding, it became more likely that current 
account balances had to be reasonably close to zero because surpluses (deficits) were not 
easily offset by increasing (decreasing) foreign assets.  Of course, because official reserve 
movements (i.e., transactions between central banks) were allowed under Bretton Woods, it 
was possible to have surpluses or deficits if financed in this way.  This allowed nations 
rebuilding their economies after World War II (e.g., Japan and West Germany) to initially 
finance deficits (partially with US aid programs such as the Marshall Plan) and subsequently 
run trade surpluses to foster more rapid economic growth and development.  By encouraging 
the use of official reserve transactions to restore external balance, governments could monitor 
those countries experiencing surpluses and deficits, and through negotiation decide the best 
way to resolve them.  In some cases, adjustments to pegged exchange rates (revaluation or 
devaluation) were used in addition to reserve movements to address imbalances. 
The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and capital controls worked well until the 
mid-1960s, when inflation in the US and other countries began to increase.  This caused real 
exchange rates to diverge, with real depreciations against the dollar in countries with inflation 
rates below the United States’.  The real exchange rate changes exacerbated differences in 
international competitiveness and increased trade imbalances.  Eventually, US President 
Richard Nixon announced on August 15, 1971 that the US gold window was officially 
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closed, decoupling the dollar from gold.  Within two years, the fixed exchange rate system 
was abandoned and the dollar was allowed to float freely on world markets. 
Because the US dollar was floating freely against the world’s currencies after February, 1973, 
it was no longer necessary to maintain capital controls on private international transactions.  
Capital controls were never popular with US international banks (Helleiner, 1996), so when 
the opportunity to remove them emerged with the abandonment of fixed exchange rates in 
1973, the United States opened up its financial system to unrestricted capital flows.  Over the 
next few years, all of the major economies did the same.  It took some time after this for the 
international financial infrastructure to develop to handle significant increases in both short-
term and long-term capital flows.  The high real interest rates in the United States that the 
Federal Reserve under Paul Volcker adopted, led to significant capital inflows into the US, a 
large increase in the dollar’s value, and large current account deficit.  This, coupled with the 
emergence of financial derivatives to help financial institutions and investors manage rising 
interest rate and foreign exchange rate risks, assisted in building the capabilities to handle 
increasingly large capital flows among countries. 
The restoration of international capital mobility allowed greater flexibility in managing 
current account imbalances.  If a nation desired to run a trade surplus, it could do so without 
experiencing an exchange rate appreciation by increasing its stock of foreign assets.  
Conversely, if a nation wanted or needed to experience a trade deficit, it could borrow 
internationally if foreign investors were willing to lend.  Countries desiring to pursue neo-
mercantilist type strategies (for reasons described in the previous section) now had additional 
ways of doing so.  Two common methods, raising trade barriers in the form of tariffs and 
quotas or deliberately undervaluing an exchange rate to make exports cheaper and imports 
more expensive (so-called beggar- thy-neighbor policies), were discouraged under Bretton 
Woods and criticized in the years that followed.  National income accounting pointed to a 
third way.  From national income accounting, it can be easily shown that the balance on trade 
in goods and services (NX) is equal to the difference between national saving (NS, the sum of 
private and government saving) and total investment (I).  In other words, 
NX = NS – I.            (1) 
If a country could raise the national saving rate (through forced saving or discouraging 
consumption expenditures) above the level of domestic investment, then that nation would 
experience a trade surplus.  It can be shown, for example, in a simple Mundell-Fleming 
model, that a tax increase (which raises national saving) in which the proceeds are invested in 
foreign currency reserves combined with an export promotion campaign would increase the 
current account balance without a change in aggregate demand that would affect real output 
or the exchange rate. 
Conversely, if a country has a great need or more opportunities for profitable domestic 
investment beyond its ability to fund them through domestic savings, it can “import” foreign 
capital by running a trade deficit. Many economists applauded this change, believing that 
freer capital mobility would allow countries to smooth consumption intertemporally, raise 
domestic investment rates, and allow for greater portfolio diversification and risk-sharing.  In 
the next section, we observe how this change manifested itself in greater trade imbalances 
without necessarily engaging in currency depreciation to achieve it. 
 
4.  Heuristic Evidence of Mercantilist-Type Strategies 
In this section, we provide empirical evidence to support the idea that more countries have 
been engaging in strategies that result in large current account surpluses and deficits. To do 
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this, we collected data from 58 countries which comprise 93% of 2014 world GDP according 
to the IMF World Economic Outlook database, (A list of countries is provided in the 
appendix). We collected annual data over the 1980-2016 period for all the countries (the 
WEO database has very little data available prior to 1980).  We use the current account 
balance as our measure of overall international trade and factor payments, because the IMF 
has compiled data for all the countries in our sample going back to 1980.2 
To learn whether there is evidence of greater current account imbalances in recent years, we 
follow the IMF methodology in its external balance reports in two respects.  First, we take the 
absolute value of each country’s current account balance for each year, sum them, and divide 
by total GDP.  The resulting time series is displayed in Figure 1.  It is clear that this measure 
increased in value over the sample period.  One way to evaluate this is to compare the 
average of this measure from 1980 to 1997 with the average from 1998 to 2016.  What we 
find is that the annual average rose from 2.28% in the early period to 3.73% in the later 
period, an increase of 63.6%.  This supports the view that imbalances have increased in 
recent years. 
Figure 1: Absolute Value of Current Account Balances Divided by GDP 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2018. The absolute values of current account 
balances, were summed, divided by GDP, and converted to percent for each year. 
A second measure, also used by the IMF, is to compare, for each year, the five largest current 
account surpluses with the five largest deficits.  Figure 2 illustrates this for the 1980-2016 
2 China started providing current account data to the IMF in 1997.   Because of the size and importance of China 
in the world economy, we decided to keep China in the sample.  All other countries report current account data 
throughout the period we are examining. 
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period.  As one can observe, there was a substantial increase in the size of current account 
deficits among the top five deficit countries after 1997. Deficits reached a trough in the 2006-
08 period, and have stabilized over the past five years at around $750 billion per year, more 
than triple the levels that prevailed prior to 1997. For the surplus countries, a similar pattern 
of growth can be observed, though the initial growth in surpluses among the top five was not 
as rapid. However, the size of the surpluses among the top five countries has hovered at 
around $750 billion per year since 2008. Virtually the same pattern is observed among the top 
ten surplus and deficit countries. 
Figure 2 
 Sum of Five Largest and Smallest Current Account Balances (Billions of US $) 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2018. 
 
To provide another means to examine the possibility of increased mercantilist activity, figure 
3 depicts the number of countries experiencing current account surpluses of varying size by 
plotting the number of countries whose surplus exceeded 3%, 5% and 10% of GDP during 
the 1980- 2016 period.  One can observe from Figure 3 that the number of countries running 
current account surpluses increased after 1995.  One way to measure this is to compare the 
average number of countries with annual surpluses over each threshold during 1980-1997 
period with the 1998-2016 period.  For those countries with a surplus of 3% or more of GDP, 
the number of countries rose from an average of 9 in the1980-1997 period to 19 in the 1998-
2016 period.  For those with surpluses exceeding 5% of GDP, the average number went from 
6 to 13 countries over the same periods, and for the 10% threshold, the number went from 3 
to 7 countries. 
Taken as a whole, we believe this is strong evidence that more countries are engaging in 
practices that lead to greater surpluses than was the case 20 years ago, and that imbalances 
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Figure 3 
 Current Account as Percent of GDP, Three Levels (Number of Countries) 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2018. Number of Countries based on a sample of 58 
countries that reported current account balances from 1980 to 2016, with the exception of China which begun 
reporting in 1997. 
To check for robustness, we also collected data on the balance on goods and services and 
found qualitatively similar results. In the next section, we provide some examples of 
countries engaging in long-term strategies that have enabled current account surpluses to 
persist. 
 
5.  Case Studies 
In this section, we examine the current account surpluses of four countries: Germany, the 
Netherlands, Singapore and Thailand.  These four nations were selected because in its 2018 
External Sector Report, the IMF deemed their external position to be “substantially stronger 
than justified by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies (current account gaps of 
more than 4 percentage points of GDP)…” (IMF, 2018, p.11). 
5.1. Germany 
At $291.1 billion in 2017, Germany has the largest current account surplus in the world 
today.  Figure 4a shows the current account balance as a percent of GDP.  The series starts in 
1991 to avoid difficulties with data prior to German reunification.  One can observe that 
Germany ran current account deficits throughout the 1990s as the process of reunification and 
investment in East Germany unfolded.  In the early 2000s, however, Germany began to adopt 
labor market reforms that restrained wages and improved international competitiveness.  The 
result was a rising current account surplus that grew to approximately 6% of GDP by 2007, 
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and the surplus has grown in the decade since the global financial crisis. 
Figure 4b shows the evolution of national saving and investment over the same period.  This 
clearly shows that national saving bottomed out around 2003 and rose to 28% of GDP by 
2017, while investment has hovered around 20% of GDP over the same period.  Given that 
the German government budget has been in surplus for the past couple of years, we believe 
the level of the current account surplus in recent years should be regarded as a manifestation 
of Germany’s economic policy choices broadly understood. 
Figure 4a 
 Germany (Current Account as % of GDP) 
Figure 4b 
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5.2 The Netherlands 
Figure 5a shows the current account balance as a percentage of GDP.  One can see that, at 
least since 1991, the current account has been in surplus.  While it has moved up and down, 
the general trend has been increasingly positive, especially since 2008.  In 2017, the 
Netherlands posted a current account surplus of $87.46 billion, which was 10.5% of GDP.   
Figure 5a 
The Netherlands: Current Account (% of GDP) 
 
Figure 5b shows the division between national saving and investment.  It is clear that national 
saving has been increasing and in 2017 stands at over 30% of GDP.  At the same time 
investment has been between 19% and 21% for the last few years.  Investment has fallen on 
average as a percentage of GDP since 2008.  It would be interesting to explore further why 
both these Euro Area countries are producing significantly more than they are spending at a 
time when other Euro countries could benefit from an increase in aggregate demand. 
Figure 5b 
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5.3. Singapore 
Despite being a small city-state of approximately 5.6 million people, Singapore ran a current 
account surplus of $61 billion in 2017, which was 18.8% of GDP.  Figure 6a shows the 
current account balance as a percent of GDP since 1991.  It demonstrates that Singapore’s 
surpluses have been consistently sustained at over 10% of GDP for over 25 years and have 
exceeded 15% of GDP since 2009.  Figure 6b breaks down the current account balance into 
national saving and investment.  National saving has been between 45 and 50 percent of GDP 
since 2005, while investment has hovered between 25 and 30 percent.  With policies like the 
National Provident Fund, Singapore has encouraged a culture of high national saving, which 
guarantees that it will have persistent current account surpluses.  
Figure 6a: Current Account as % of GDP 
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5.4 Thailand 
The fourth country that has experienced a “substantially strong” current account surplus 
according to the IMF is Thailand, which had a surplus of $51.1 billion in 2017 (11.2% of 
GDP).  Figure 7a shows the current account balances since 1991.   The country had 
experienced large deficits prior to the Asian financial crisis in 1997 which started in 
Thailand.  Thailand had to rapidly move to surplus after the sudden stop, and since then has 
managed to remain in surplus.  Since 2013, its surplus has increased, reaching over 10 
percent of GDP in 2016 and 2017, which sum to approximately $100 billion for those two 
years. 
Figure 7a: Thailand: Current Account as % of GDP 
 
 
Looking at Figure 7b, one can see that national saving has risen by over 5 percentage points 
over the past four years.  At the same time, total investment relative to GDP has fallen, so its 
current account has soared.  According to the IMF, it attributes the rapid rise in the surplus to 
a boom in tourism coupled with weak domestic demand during a political transition.  Unlike 
the other three examples, it is unclear if Thailand’s high surplus will be sustained over time. 
 While these country examples are not conclusive, they support our view that a number of 
countries are continuing to pursue large current account surpluses well after the global 
financial crisis of 2007-09. During the crisis, a number of countries experienced sudden stops 
so their ability to maintain current account deficits became more difficult since foreign 
investors were unwilling to hold their financial assets (e.g., Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Spain, 
and Portugal).  These and other countries were forced by events or IMF conditionality to 
adopt austerity policies to reduce their current account deficits. If deficit countries were using 
expenditure reducing policies to help restore external balance, then other countries needed to 
increase their demand to maintain or increase overall global demand. However, if the largest 
surplus countries were maintaining the policies of export enhancement that worked well for 
them in the past, then global demand would fall or, at best, increase at a slower rate, creating 
a challenging environment for robust economic growth. If these countries were persuaded to 
reduce their surpluses by adopting policies that increase aggregate demand, this could benefit 
countries which are struggling to grow. 
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Figure 7a: Thailand: Current Account as % of GDP 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
While this research is hardly conclusive, it does suggest that a number of surplus countries 
are continuing to engage in policies that are increasing their surpluses. With the United States 
currently (as of June 30, 2018) experiencing a net international investment position of $ -8.6 
trillion, it seems that America’s historic role that some have characterized as the “importer of 
last resort” may be starting to change, especially if the new Administration’s policy of “Make 
America Great Again” is carried out.  If this does happen, then it is worth asking what will be 
the sources of growth of global demand in the future. It seems reasonable to suggest that 
nations that have run substantial surpluses in recent years increase their global demand to 
foster a better economic environment for global economic growth. Whether this can be 
accomplished in a spirit of international cooperation and long run mutual benefit remains to 
be seen. 
The Trump administration has provided less support for multilateralism and the work of 
transnational organizations such as the IMF and World Bank than previous administrations.  
It is difficult to see how diminishing the role of multilateral institutions can make the 
adjustments of deficit countries easier.  Higgott (2018) observes that declining US support for 
multilateralism has provided China with a much larger role in global leadership.  While 
China’s current account has made a remarkable turnaround, China’s Belt and Road foreign 
investment program appears to be generating considerable resentment in the receiving 
countries and may contribute to nationalist reactions among deficit countries.3  Much has 
been written recently about the rise of populism, but the US administration’s policies, 
especially the extensive use of tariff polices to rebalance the current account, are more 
3 For a discussion of the debt implications of Belt and Road see Hurley, Morris et al.  (2018)  For an analysis of 
the Belt and Road Initiative from Yanis Varoufakis’s (Varoufakis 2011) Global Surplus Recycling Mechanism 
Hypothesis, see Chohan (2018). 
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obviously examples of economic nationalism than populism.  The heavy reliance on tariffs 
and trade restrictions clearly sets an example that deficit countries will be tempted to follow.4 
A policy implication of the paper is that perhaps the IMF needs to take a more active role in 
encouraging countries running large, persistent current account surpluses to adopt policies 
that may reduce imbalances.  If this can be done in a way to increase aggregate demand 
without causing higher inflation, this would potentially benefit global economic growth.  
Ironically, a decline in US support for multilateral solutions will make it more difficult for the 
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